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In a world characterised by noisy information and con‡icting signals,
no Central Bank is always able to a¤ectprivate sector expectations. Based
on Morris and Shin’s model, monetary policy then becomes an informa-
tion game, in which individuals form their expectations based on all the
information that is available to them (public and private). However indi-
vidual agents also know that ultimately in‡ation is a¤ected by both the
objectives of the Central Bank (and hence the policies it pursues) as well
as the average expectation formed by the all agents. They thus need to
evaluate both actions. Central to ourargument is the way that individuals
interpret these actions to form their expectations. We apply Bacharach’s
methodology to provide a framework for assessing everyone’s interpreta-
tions. Our contribution is to merge these two models to show that a
monetary policy regime that has explicit quantitative objectives may pro-
vide individuals with better anchors for expectations to coordinate at.
However, that is only true …rst, if no great shocks are anticipated to hit
the economy and second, when all other public information is very unclear
thus rendering the in‡ation target the only clear piece of information. We
derive in detail the conditions under which this is true.
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11 Introduction
Modern monetary policy theory emphasizes the central role of private sector
expectations in determining policy outcomes. Recent empirical evidence by
Paloviita and Virén (2005).demonstrate this for in‡ation in the euro area. It is
thus widely acknowledged, that the success of maintaining a stable monetary
environment depends crucially on the ability of the policy regime to control
in‡ation expectations (Blinder et al, 2001). Evidence of that is shown by Or-
phanides and Williams (2004) in their analysis of US monetary policy history,
where they argue that monetary policy failures are connected with changes in
public sentiment about the future state of the economy. In other words, policy
mistakes alone are not enough to produce long term negative e¤ects on monetary
stability.
The practice of monetary policy in the past ten to …fteen years has thus con-
centrated on providing institutional set-ups that provide an explicit information
platform for expectations to be formed. The main features of such institutional
set-ups are:
² credible institutions, mainly through independence and the pursuit of the
principal objective of price stability;
² clear policy frameworks, captured by well de…ned intermediate policy ob-
jectives and procedures, and …nally,
² transparent policy making, implemented through publication and distri-
bution of the information set used in the decision making process (in‡a-
tion forecasts, modelling strategies, well de…ned assumptions) and a clear
demonstration of accountability (publication of minutes, regular appear-
ance in front of parliamentary committees and regular press conferences).
Practically every monetary policy authority nowadays de…nes its policies accord-
ing to these criteria, emphasising one or another aspect, depending on prefer-
ences. The set-up of the twelve-country Euro area for example, has emphasised
the importance of building and sustaining credibility and independence from
governments, as an instrument towards low expected in‡ation. In the US expe-
rience instead, credibility, independence but also ‡exibility in following multiple
objectives has helped achieve a stable monetary environment. Alternatively, in-
‡ation targeting as implemented …rst, by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and
then the Bank of England, and increasingly more and more banks around the
world, is understood to provide clear and immediate objectives for monetary
policy. In‡ation targeting practitioners argue that the main advantage of an
explicit numerical in‡ation target is its ability to provide a focal point for pri-
vate sector expectations. As Mervyn King (2002, p.4) has claimed for the UK
case, in‡ation expectations have indeed been anchored to the pre-announced
target. The ability of explicit quantitative targets to tie down expectations,
is also con…rmed by the empirical analysis of Levin et al (2004), Mishkin and
2Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and more recently by Fatás et al (2004)1.
However, conventional monetary policy models (Svensson, 1999, 2003) allow for
no di¤erence in the way in‡ation targeting is modelled by comparison to other
regimes2. There is thus no explicit analysis of the way the provision of a speci…c
numerical target may constitute a better anchor for private sector expectations.
What is the mechanism that makes the in‡ation target a better anchor and
which conditions are required for this to be true? In our view, to be able to
answer that, we need a mechanism of expectations formation more complex than
the standard full information rational expectations paradigm.
The recent model put forward by Morris and Shin (2002a, 2002b) (and used in
Amato et al, 2003 and Amato and Shin, 2003) renders itself to identifying …rst,
how private agents form expectations based on private and public information
available to them and second, to showing how policy makers a¤ect these expec-
tations by providing greater or lesser information. It is shown in this set-up,
that in forming these expectations, private agents care not only about their own
views but also about other people’s expectations, as a means to con…rming their
own beliefs. In fact Phelps (1983) noted that “...in order to reduce the price
level (in relation to the accustomed trend), it is not su¢cient that the central
bank persuade each agent to reduce his private expectation of the money sup-
ply (in relation to the past trend) by the warranted amount. The prevalence
of this expectation must be public knowledge - an accepted fact”(p.35). And
as the ‘beauty contest’ element (based on Keynes, 1936) plays a greater role
in expectations forming, signals provided by public institutions can conceivably
become tantamount to coordination devices. This therefore, implies that mon-
etary policy can be viewed as a coordination game between the Central Bank
and the private sector but also as a matching game between the private sector
themselves. Due tothe latter, public information then acquires a dual role -“...of
conveying fundamentals information as well as serving as a focal point for be-
liefs” (Morris and Shin, 2002a, henceforth, MS 2002). The question that arises
following this argument is then, what monetary policy regimes provide better
signals and in which way these signals constitute focal points3. The aim of this
paper is to formalise the widely believed but little analysed bene…ts of in‡ation
targeting in coordinating private individuals’ expectations and the conditions
necessary for this to be achieved.
The theory on coordination games provides valuable insight into the way that
such games are resolved. For example, it is often observed that in matching
games players coordinate much more frequently than by randomising (Casajus,
2000). Indeed, according to Wilson and Rhodes (1997), it is to the bene…t of all
1See also Leiderman and Svensson (1995) and Bernanke et al (1999) for earlier accounts of
experiences with in‡ation targeting.
2Kuttner 2004, alsoalludes to this fact. The bene…ts of in‡ation targeting as a coordination
device have been discussed by Hughes Hallett and Viegi, 2002, but then in the context of two
policy authorities, the policies of which might have strong "spillovers".
3See Sugden (1999) for a theory on focal points. Also Bryan and Palmqvist (2005) apply
the term "focal points" to monetary policy, in a similar fashion to ours.
3actors to avoid the con‡ict that escalates as solutions are delayed. To achieve
that, players rely heavily on salient features when deciding on their actions.
And salience in this context, can be a “...social custom or convention, namely, a
mode of behaviour that …nds automatic acceptance” (Dixit and Skeath, 1999)
and a salient item is “...one that stands out from the rest by its uniqueness in
some conspicuous respect.” (Bacharach 1993). Furthermore, Wilson and Rhodes
(1997) argue that all that is required for such salience to be achieved is a signal
from somebody that can be recognised as the ‘leader’ in the game, to send a
signal. A commonly accepted leader, in a clearly de…ned leader-follower(s) game,
can thus provide such a focal point. In our set-up, the Central Bank acquires
this leadership role by the sheer extent of its contribution to the …nal in‡ation
outcome. Providing then a numerical target, we argue, grants private agents
the choice between two actions, by comparison to a regime in which a numerical
target is absent. These are, either to internalise the announced target and treat
it as an additional piece of public information or, driven by their incentive to
coordinate, ignore all other information and …x their expectations at that level.
Given the intentions of the Central Bank, the latter is naturally the preferred
option, but then only if everybody else pursues this option as well. In deciding
between these two options therefore, the agent remains uncertain as to how
others view the target. Trusting the target for oneself is neither necessary nor
is it su¢cient for pursuing it; what is actually pivotal to one’s choice is how
every individual understands others’ interpretation of the target and the Central
Bank’s ability to achieve it. What the individual needs therefore, is a framework
that will help …rst, identify what her options are and second, evaluate how
these options are understood by all others. To this end, we employ the Variable
Universe Games approach put forward by Bacharach (1993) which describes
how players evaluate their options in the context of what everyone else might
believe about them.
Our contribution then is tomerge the MS (2002) framework to that of Bacharach
(1993), in order to provide the individual with a framework to identify her best
action, allowing for her personal interpretation of the options available to her.
We …nd that numerical targets are e¤ective coordinators of expectations when
no great shocks are anticipated, or when all other public information available
to individuals is prohibitively imprecise.
The paper is organised as follows. With the aid of a standard monetary policy
model, section 2 describes how monetary policy can be seen as an information
game based on the work by MS (2002). We then explain how the provision of
numerical targets increases the options available to individuals. Section 3 then
describes Bacharach’s (1993) approach to interpreting the options available to
all players and section 4 merges the two models. Section 5 concludes.
42 Monetary Policy as an Information Game
The Central Bank has a standard loss function in which it chooses the rate of
in‡ation x to minimise the distance of in‡ation from its target
¡
x ¡ xT ¢
and









subject to a standard Lucas supply function, y = x¡ xe + » where » is a supply
shock with zero mean and constant variance, ￿ 2
». Note that any Central Bank
will have an objective xT irrespective of whether it has communicated it to
the public clearly, or even at all. We assume for simpli…cation that the CB’s











where x is now the ex post in‡ation outcome conditional on the shock » and xe
is private sector expectations about the relevant rate of in‡ation. Representa-
tion (2) is of a structural form4 in the sense that expectations are not replaced
(Leitemo, 2005). Svensson (2003) argues in favour of such a representation in
order to indicate that factors like judgement that contribute to the way expec-
tations are formed but cannot always be modelled, are an important contributor
to monetary policy. In a typical commitment game, where the Central Bank
communicates its target xT and commits to it, expectations formed by all indi-
viduals collectively are equal to the CB’s objectives, xe = xT and the ex post
outcome is




E (x) = x
T (4)
The objective of this paper however, is to depart from the assumption that
expectations are always equal to the objective of the Central Bank and analyse
4Note that (2) is speci…ctothe underlyingLucas supply function assumed but demonstrates
that the outcomewill be afunction of both thepolicythe Central Bank pursues as wellas what
the private sector anticipates. Similarly, had the model been of the standard Neokeynesian
type,
xt =ﬂEtxt+1 +kyt +"t
yt =Etyt+1 ¡￿ (it ¡Etxt+1)+·t









Our point is to show that the ex post outcome is a function of both the CB objective as
well as the expectations of the private sector.
5how individuals go about interpreting the information that is available to them
when forming expectations. Every individual i will be forming an expectation
of in‡ation xi, such that the collective outcome (for a continuum of agents) is
xe =
R 1
0 xjdj, which is the expectation that is relevant to the in‡ation outcome.
The time of the game assumed has the Central Bank deciding what its objectives
are …rst, shocks occur next, then private agents form expectations based on
information available about these shocks and policy objectives and …nally the
CB reacts to the supply shock ».
2.1 The Formation of Expectations
We thus start by arguing that while the CB may be clear itself about what its
objectives are, it is not always possible to assume that private individuals form
expectations that are consistent with these objectives. It becomes important
then to examine, the information that is available to the private sector and how
they use it to form expectations. Typically, every individual forms expectations
based on two information sets, namely what is publicly available and therefore
common to everyone, and what is available to them privately. Furthermore,
every individual is aware of the fact that the ex post outcome of in‡ation x will
be determined by (2), in other words will be a¤ected equally (given the model
assumed) by the policy the Central Bank pursues to attain its objectives, as
well as the average of expectations formed by the public.
However, as the individual is interested in predicting the ex post level of in‡ation
correctly, she needs to interpret both components of (2) based on the information







Ei(xi ¡ x)2 (5)
Note that subscript i in the expectations operator, indicates that the individual
will be seeking to minimise her expected dis-utility, given her own perceptions.
xi is individual i’s expectation of what in‡ation will be and x is again the ex post
in‡ation outcome. We use xe to refer to the expectations pro…le over all agents.
The objective of each individual i is thus to form expectations xi, as accurately
as possible, which she will then use, for example, in wage negotiations. The









5We assume that the individual consumer sets a pricevariable (individual wage) and supply
elastically to the amount of labour demanded. This is just a narrative trick: the argument
would work equally well in a set up as in Lucas’ island model in which individuals set the


























The optimal action for individual i is thus a function of three things: the objec-
tives of the central Bank and hence the policy it will pursue, the shock that will
occur and …nally the average expectation formed by all individuals. Moreover,
in forming expectations xi, individual i needs to evaluate these three things,
captured here by the expectations operator, subscript i6. It follows that if
xi = xj 8j, then xi = xe and individuals’ expectations are matched. However,
although desirable, coordination between agents at any level of in‡ation is not
su¢cient; the optimal outcome occurs when agents coordinate at the objective
pursued by the Central Bank. Coordination at any other expectation rate still
leaves agents away from the level of in‡ation that the CB aims to achieve. We
will argue further down, that knowledge of the CB objective is necessary but
not su¢cient for coordination at it. Following MS (2002), we argue that infor-
mation used by the agents is available in the form of a public signal common to
all, and a private signal which is speci…c to each agent in the economy. These
take the following form:












Both · and "i are normally distributed with a zero mean and variance ￿ 2
· and
￿2
" respectively. Furthermore, the two error terms are independent of x and of
each other, such that E ("i"j) = 0 for i 6= j. Contrary to MS then, the clarity
of public information is not under the full control of the CB but it is a¤ected
by a conbination of the CB’s information strategy, general market information
available and noise. Based on these two types of signals, MS show that action









6Equation (6) is not dissimilar to equation (2) of MS (2002) in which the individual forms
a view about the state ￿ and the average action, ¹ a. The strength with which she pursues
that is given by the “beauty term” parameter r, equal here to the value
1
2, provided by the
model. An important di¤erence to the MS (2002) approach however, is that the state xis now
endogenous, in the sense of being a¤ected by the average action, whereas in the MS approach




· and ﬂ =
1
￿2
", precision for the two information sets respectively.











Equation (10) shows that the average expectation across all agents will be dis-
torted by the (lack of) precision of the two signals as well as the preference for
the ‘beauty term’ r, here equal to 1
2 (in 6).
2.2 The Role of In‡ation Targets
As argued earlier, the CB aims to set in‡ation equal to xT . However this
objective is not necessarily common knowledge to all private agents; it is in-
stead subject to interpretation, a¤ected by the way the CB communicates its
objectives to the public, or indeed by its ability to achieve it, given its track
record (credibility). The objective of the central bank is therefore, not uniquely
‘conspicuous’, in the sense of being seen and understood in the same way by
everyone7. As indicated in (9), private individuals weigh their own private infor-
mation against what is publicly known and decide accordingly. This is true for
any monetary policy regime. We argue next, that a Central Bank that provides
a quantitative target di¤ers to a Central Bank that does not in the following
sense. The individual is now e¤ectively presented with two options: either pur-
sue the action indicated in (9) in which the in‡ation target is internalised and
judged just like any other piece of public information, or alternatively, driven by
her desire to coordinate, adopt the in‡ation target and …x her expectations at it.
In modelling terms, the provision of a quantitative objective has the following
implication. Every individual is faced with the choice between two alternatives
for her action ai: either to weigh all information available to her and thus follow
the strategy suggested by Morris and Shin xi, or simply form an expectation
equal to the quantitative level of in‡ation announced by the Central Bank, xT.
By analogy, the same applies for the collective action ¹ a, such that respectively
for the two alternatives, the MS action leads to an average in‡ation expectation
of xe, whereas following the CB target leads to xT 8. Based on (5), we turn next
to the general form of individual i’s dis-utility which is a¤ected by both her own
action ai, as well as the average action ¹ a.
ui (ai;¹ a) ´ Ei(ai ¡ x)2 (11)
7We depart from the MS (2002) set up here in so far that we do not assume that the level
of clarity of the signal is completely within the CB ’s control. The clarity of the signal is
partly determined by the central bank, partly parametric and partly dependent on the shocks
hitting the economy. This allows us to introduce meaningfully the provision of a numerical
in‡ation target as a communication instrument.
8For simplicity we assume that the collective action is either xT or xe and nothing inbe-
tween.
8Following the announcement of an in‡ation target, then individual i is faced
with two options9. Either she weighs the public information available against
her own private information and thus follows ai = xi as suggested by MS, where








Similarly, we can infer what the collective action will be. If all individuals follow
the action suggested by Morris and Shin, then ¹ a = xe, where,




By contrast when all individuals follow the target, then in‡ation expectation is
¹ a = xT
For a continuum of agents, the in‡ation outcome is a¤ected by the collective
action ¹ a, and not the action of the individual ai. For the former case, the ex































Following these four possible actions, we calculate next the payouts for individ-
ual i based on (11).






Choice 2: ai = xT;¹ a = xe

































We summarise the payout matrix for individual i, given the two alternative
collective actions, as follows:
Table 1: Expected Payouts for Individual i















Table 1 summarises the pure form strategies available to individual i, and the
possible dis-utility outcomes associated with them. However, Table 1 fails to
capture an important element in the game, and that is the uncertainty that
individual i faces, with respect to how all other individuals perceive this target
and therefore, what the collective action will be. From her own perspective
therefore, before deciding on her own action, individual i needs to evaluate how
likely the two alternative collective actions, xe and xT, are. It is not su¢cient
therefore, to evaluate for herself, the clarity or credibility of the signal that the
Central Bank provides; more important to her decision is how she interprets
what others believe about that signal. What the individual is concerned with
therefore, is the following: given the inherent incentive to coordinate, are there
conditions under which it is always to her bene…t to follow the signal? If on
the other hand, the collective action applied is of paramount importance to
which action the individual should choose, how does she go about deciding? We
provide next a framework for her to do that, the last step required before she
decides on an action.
3 A framework for Interpreting Expectations
While Table 1 identi…es the options that are available to the individual, we
provide next a framework for interpreting these options, given the action of the
counter-player (i.e. the collective action). This is based on Bacharach’s Variable
Universe Games (1993) framework, which helps describe how players evaluate
their strategies to identify salient points when forming expectations in matching
games10. The novelty of this approach is that it allows explicitly for di¤erences
10Used and extended by Janssen (2001).
10in perceptions which then helps players choose rationally between alternative
outcomes. The framework provided shows that in matching games, the players’
incentive to coordinate induces them to look for salient points. However, as
salience is subject to personal interpretation, the existence of such features is
not necessarily uniquely de…ned. We describe the approach …rst, and apply it
explicitly to our question then in section 4.
3.1 An Expected Utility Approach
The game of blockmarking is played in the following way. Two players are
shown a number of wooden blocks and each has to secretly pick one. If both
players pick the same block, they receive an identical pecuniary prize; otherwise
they receive nothing. The author then describes three variants of the game,






Figure 1: The Game of Blockmarking
In Blockmarking 1, (B1), the players are given …ve identical blocks (in size,
colour, shape and material). In Blockmarking 2, (B2), the same game is re-
peated, except now one of the …ve blocs is of a di¤erent colour, (white). In
Blockmarking 3, (B3), players are now given 20 blocks, eighteen of which are
grey and two are white. Furthermore, closer inspection of the blocks, allows
players to see that the grain of the wood in just one of the grey blocks is wavy.
B3 can thus be described either in terms of colour, (C) or in terms of the grain
of the wood, (G). As the game is of a matching nature, it is to the players’
interest to look for salient features that help achieve tacit coordination. In ex-
ample B1 above, there is no clear way of di¤erentiating between the blocks, so
one is inclined to simply pick at random. At example B2 however, the di¤erence
in colour allows players to distinguish between the blocks in such a way, that
it is always wise to go for the one that is white. The unique instantiation of
the white block thus provides the two players with a focal point. Similarly in
11B3, if colour is the distinguishing feature that occurs to the players, they are
then inclined to pick one of the white blocks, even though such action does not
automatically lead to coordination. However, if a player has managed to see
that not only colour but also the grain of the wood di¤erentiates the blocks,
uniqueness is again guaranteed. The di¢culty now however, is that the grain
pattern of the wood is not necessarily identi…able (conspicuous) by (to) all play-
ers. In forming her choice therefore, having seen the di¤erence in grain herself,
player 1, needs to assess how likely her partner is to distinguish the blocks in
terms of the grain as well. Bacharach’s analysis shows, that if this likelihood
is big, then it is to her interest to pick the grey block with the wavy pattern;
otherwise she is better o¤ picking one of the white blocks and face an, at most,
50% chance of matching the choice of her partner.
Bacharach provides a thorough proof to B3 in the appendix to his paper, but the
essence of the game faced by the two players individually can be summarised as
follows. In solving B3, player 1 is e¤ectively faced with two alternative actions:
Me h, mark a white block at random, or Mw, mark the grey block with the
wavy grain. Furthermore, as explained above, the crucial point in this analysis
is the likelihood with which player 1 believes player 2 has noticed the grain.
She is thus left with the following two choices when forming her views about
player 2. Either she believes that her opponent has seen the grain (and assigns
probability v to that event), or she does not believe that he has seen the grain
(and assigns probability 1¡ v to that event). It is reasonable to assume that if
player 2 has indeed noticed the grain, then he will pick it with some non-zero
probability. However, if he has not noticed the grain then he can never mark
a block accordingly. From player 1’s perspective therefore, her expected utility
from choosing one of her two actions is the following.
De…nition 1: Both players have an identical set of feasible strategies, R+ =









player 1’s utility from following action x1;a(²) and player 2 following action
x2;a(²), for a 2 A where a(C) = Me h and a(G) = Mw.
We need to deal with two cases:
Case 1: Player 2 always marks a block according to colour, either because he
has not seen the grain himself, or because he believes his partner has not. Then
player 1’ expected utility is
















We normalise next U (x1 = x2) = 1, and calculate the expected utilities:
12E1U(Me h;Me h) = (1¡ v)
1
2
U (x1 = x2) + v
1
2
U (x1 = x2) =
1
2
E1U(Mw;Me h) = (1¡ v) ¤0 + v ¤ 0 = 0
This implies that E1U(Me h;Me h) > E1U(Mw;Me h) and therefore player 1 has
an incentive to match her partner’s action by also picking a white block at
random.
Case 2: Player 2 now, marks a block based on the grain when he has noticed
it. Otherwise, he marks a block according to colour. Then expected utility for
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But between the two cases, the necessary and su¢cient condition for player 1





Me h or Mw
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In other words, the balance of reasons favours marking the block with the wavy
grain, only if v is a large enough number by comparison to 1
m where m is the
number of white blocks. Bacharach argues therefore, that the relative rarity of
the white blocks, captured here by 1
2, is pulling against the conspicuousness v of
the grain pattern, as the less rare the white blocks (bigger m), the more likely
the player is to pick the wavy grey block.
The point that is crucial to Bacharach’s analysis is the fact that players have
particular ways of perceiving the game, such that the framing of the game
13(universe) available to them individually is not necessarily available to other
players as well (variable). Before deciding on a possible action therefore, for
example picking the block with the wavy grain (provided they have seen it), the
player has to form a view as to how likely her counterpart is to have noticed
the grain (as well as the colour) as a possible distinguishing feature. Evaluating
that is necessary before picking a strategy, implying that having noticed the
grain for oneself is not su¢cient to pick it. Any player therefore, needs to assess
whether their own beliefs as to what is conspicuous to them is also conspicuous
to others. Picking the wavy block is the desirable strategy only if, given her
assessment of this likelihood, the expected value of doing so is greater than the
expected value of picking a white block at random.
4 Variable Universes and In‡ation Targets
How does the analogy carry over to monetary policy? As argued above, a Cen-
tral Bank that provides an explicit quantitative target presents the individual
with two options: to either treat the target like any other piece of public infor-
mation and simply apply the MS rule in deciding on her actions or, alternatively,
adopt the in‡ation target and …x her expectation on it. The latter is naturally
an attractive alternative because of her desire to coordinate, re‡ected in the
second term in equation (6). But for this latter option to be attractive enough,
the individual needs to have su¢cient con…dence that others will pick the target
as well. Just as in the blockmarking game, the fact that a target (wavy block)
is provided (is seen for oneself) is not su¢cient for the individual to coordinate
at it; what is required further is for the individual to have enough con…dence
that others will think the same way. In that respect, her interpretation of the
way the target is perceived by others is key to her decision. So while there
is no uncertainty as to what strategies are available to people by comparison
to the blockmarking game, there is uncertainty as to how these strategies are
perceived. It is in this sense that Bacharach’s approach is useful to our analysis.
Following Bacharach’s approach, we then need to deal with two cases regarding
the actions taken:
Case 1: First we assume that when the Central Bank announces its quanti-
tative in‡ation objective, the collective action applies it occasionally. Player i
therefore, forms a belief about the likelihood v with which the collective action
will be equal to that target, in which case, with likelihood (1¡v), the collective
action will simply treat the in‡ation target as just an extra piece of public infor-








































































































(1 ¡ v)(2ﬁ + ﬂ)
2 (22)
or in other words, for a any given value of v (even zero), for the in‡ation target
to be the optimal strategy for player i, it is su¢cient that the supply shock is
small enough.
Case 2: However, Player i may have to do with the fact that others do not
interpret the target in the way intended by the Central Bank and therefore,
prefer to simply weigh public against private information and thus follow the
action derived by Morris and Shin. This may be either because they do not
understand or believe the intentions of the Central Bank, or because they do
not trust that others understand or believe the intentions of the Central Bank.
This achieves an average expectation for in‡ation equal to xe. Then player i’s
expected dis-utility of following either of her two options is:











Based on Table 1, then these are















































Note that if (23) holds, then (22) is also satis…ed, so that the former is the
necessary and su¢cient condition for individual i to pick the target.
154.1 In‡ation Targeting as a dominant strategy
Note that if (23) holds, then based on Table 1, following the target becomes
the dominant pure form strategy, in that the individual will always choose to
form in‡ation expectations according to the in‡ation target. At the same time,
and allowing for interpretation uncertainty to characterise the game, satisfying
this condition guarantees that the expectation value of adopting the target is
improved. In other words, for this to be true, it is important that the supply
shock is smaller than agiven ratio. Figure 2 shows that this condition (condition
(23) drawn against values of ﬁ and ﬂ) is very stringent, in the sense that in‡ation
targeting is dominant only if shocks arevery small in size. Indeed, if theeconomy
is hit by very big shocks then the condition is not satis…ed, and the provision
of a target does not help agents coordinate at the level intended by the Central
Bank. This is intuitively appealing because it evaluates the e¤ectiveness of the
target within the context of economic conditions in which it is applied.
Figure 2: In‡ation Targeting as a dominant Strategy
Moreover, …gure 2 also shows that if public information is very imprecise (ﬁ is
low) then the provision of an in‡ation target becomes helpful, in the sense that
the condition becomes easier to satisfy. This implies that numerical targets
become substitutes for imprecise public information; in the absence of con-
crete information, the provision of one clear in‡ation target becomes the only
unequivocal piece of public information. And that is true irrespective of the
interpretation parameter, v. To carry the analogy to the blockmarking game, if
white blocks become more and more numerous, then having seen the grain, one
is more likely to pick it.
4.2 Expectations formation as a matching game
However if (23) is not satis…ed, i.e., ￿2
» >
ﬂ
(2ﬁ+ﬂ)2 then, from Table 1, individual’s
optimal action in pure strategies requires "matching" the average action. When
allowing for the uncertainty of interpretations, then for in‡ation targeting to
16produce higher expected dis-utility, condition (22) must be satis…ed and by
consequence the value of the interpretation parameter v is relevant. Condition








Figure 3 plots condition (24) in the ﬁ and ﬂ space for four di¤erent values of
the supply shock (0 < ￿» < 1)11.
s=1
s=0.25
Figure 3: The Role of Interpretations
There are two interesting features that arise from …gure 3. First, it is the case
that as the variance of the shock increases, then (24) becomes more di¢cult to
satisfy. In other words, if larger shocks are expected, then individual i needs an
ever great degree of con…dence v that others will follow the target, before she
picks it herself. This is consistent with what is mentioned above when in‡ation
targeting is a dominant strategy for individual i, namely that in the presence
of large shocks, in‡ation targeting is less convincing in its role as a coordinator
of expectations. Second, as public information su¤ers from lack of clarity (i.e.
ﬁ small), the provision of a clear and unique quantitative signal helps relax the
stringency of the condition.
In both cases from above, the role of private information is de-emphasised in
that it does not impose a constraint on either (23)or (24) to hold. This is demon-
strated in …gure 4 for the latter condition for di¤erent values of ﬂ (overlapping
plates on the graph).
11As v is constrained to take values between 0 and 1, so is condition (24).
17Figure 4: The role of private information
5 Conclusions
Any private individual forms expectations of in‡ation based on information
that is available to her. Our paper concentrates on the way the Central Bank’s
communication strategy might a¤ect these expectations. We begin our analysis
by arguing that it is not always possible for a monetary policy authority to
assume that it can a¤ect private expectations in the way that they will match its
own intentions. Private individuals rely on information that is available to them
publicly (and thus common to everyone) and information that might be unique
to them individually. Monetary policy then, becomes an information game, in
which private individuals base their decision on a combination of all information
available, corrected for their respective degree of precision, (or lack of). As the
level of expectations a¤ects the …nal outcome of in‡ation, the private sector
needs to deduce both what the objective of the Central Bank is and its ability
to achieve it, as well as what everybody else’s beliefs are. We apply the Morris
and Shin model to demonstrate that the latter point implies that coordinated
expectations are preferable although not necessarily the guarantee of optimal
outcomes. Further to that, we then use Bacharach’s Variable Universe approach
to demonstrate exactly how people interpret the options available to them given
the actions of all other players in the game. Our contribution has therefore, been
to merge the two models and provide a comprehensive framework for individuals
to enumerate their options and thus form expectations.
Based on this, we …nd that a Central Bank that announces a very precise quan-
titative target may, ceteris paribus, bene…t from helping private sector expec-
tations coordinate at the level of its objectives. We describe the conditions for
which this happens and discover that in‡ation targeting does indeed achieve co-
ordination, …rst when the supply shocks expected are small - in other words the
18economy is stable and second, when public information fails in all other respects
to provide the private sector with clear signals as to what the level of in‡ation
relevant to them is going to be. It is in this sense that we argue that in‡ation
targets are substitutes for poor, otherwise, public information. Naturally, as
we show above, it is not su¢cient for any individual to view this quantitative
signal just for herself, as a satisfactory substitute. She must have a high enough
degree of con…dence that all other agents do too. If this holds, then following
the signal constitutes her preferred strategy.
19APPENDICES
A Individual i’s Dis-Utility







Ei(xi ¡ x)2 (25)
The most direct way to rationalise the loss function (25) is to consider it an
approximation of a model of a monopolistically competitive labour market in
which …rms set prices and individuals set wages, as in Erceg at al (2000). and
Woodford (2003). Individual i then supplies a type of labour i, such that total
demand for labour is the aggregate of all the individual types, according to a







It follows that demand for labour type i on the part of the wage taking …rm is
given by





where wt(i) is the wage of individual i and Wt is the aggregate wage index, Thus
individual i takes the demand for labour as given and …xes the nominal wage to
maximise a standard utility function in consumption and leisure, under a stan-












where P is the consumer price index. Individual i determines her nominal wage,
her consumption and her labour supply at the beginning of period t, given her
expected level of prices and the form of her utility function. For a marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure equal to ¡1, condition (26)
reduces to:
wt (i) = E (Pt) (27)
which is equivalent to the …rst order condition of (25). The actual form used is
a simpli…cation for reason of tractability.
20B The Role of In‡ation Targets
(for refereeing purposes)
In terms of the model adopted, the provision of a quantitative objective has the
following implication. Every individual is faced with the choice between two
actions, ai: either to weigh all information available to her and thus follow the
strategy suggested by Morris and Shin, xi, or simply form an expectation equal
to the quantitative level of in‡ation announced by the Central Bank, xT. By
analogy, the same applies for the collective action ¹ a, such that respectively for
the two alternatives, the MS action leads to an average in‡ation expectation of
xe, whereas following the CB target leads to xT. Based on (5), we turn next
to the general form of individual i’s dis-utility which is a¤ected by her own
action ai, as well as the average action ¹ a. The latter in turn a¤ects the in‡ation
outcome, x.
ui (ai;¹ a) ´ Ei(ai ¡ x)2 (28)
Following the announcement of an in‡ation target, then individuali is faced with
two options. Either she weighs the public information available against her own
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or, simply ignores all information and follows the target, leading to her action
being
ai = xT (30)
If individuals follow collectively the action suggested by Morris and Shin, ¹ a = xe
where




By contrast when all individuals follow the target, then in‡ation expectation is
¹ a = xT
For a continuum of agents the in‡ation outcome is a¤ected by the average action

































































Following these four possible actions, we calculate next the payouts for individ-
ual i based on (28).
Choice 1: ai = xi;¹ a = xe
u1 (xi;xe) ´ Ei(ai ¡ x)2
= Ei
·

















































































´ Ei(ai ¡ x)2
= Ei
µ































































We summarise the payout matrix in normal form for player i, given the two
alternative collective actions, as follows:
Table 1: Expected Payouts for Player 1
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